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The emergence of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries as a powerful actor on the
world scene has fundamentally changed not only
the international oil market, but also the very
character of international relations. Yet the power
of OPECdemonstrated in the development of
oil prices as well as in the application of supply
reductions as a political weapon by a group of
Arab oil producershas not only shown its
capabilities, but also its limitations. The real
value of oil has already been eroded considerably
since 1974, and the oil weapon (though no doubt
an important ever in international relations) was
sheathed long before its declared objectives had
been reached. Besides, OPEC's power became
obvious only after ten years of the organization's
existence.
It was the year 1970 which constituted a water-
shed in the international oil marketand it was
Libya which played a crucial role in this develop-
ment. Libya was the first to demonstrate the
freedom of manoeuvre of the producers by forc-
ing the companies operating in the country to
reduce output, and then to accept higher prices
and changes in the tax structure. A variety of
particular circumstances at that time helped Libya
in succeeding with its confrontation tactics, but
these circumstances only exacerbated the under-
lying changes in the international oil market. The
relationship of forces between producers and
consumers had changed fundamentally.
The basis of OPEC's power lies in the trade rela-
tionship between oil exporting and industrialised
oil consuming countries; it consists essentially in
the ability to withhold supplies. A measure of
this power is the amount of damage the reduction
or interruption of supplies would cause in the
consumer countries. The first ingredient of OPEC
oil power is therefore the high dependence of con-
sumers on continued and sufficient supplies.
To illustrate this point, it is sufficient to recall the
overriding importance of energy in the function-
ing of a modern society. The correlation between
energy consumption and economic growth is a
close one. During the supply crisis 1973/74, the
Japanese government estimated that a 16 per cent
shortfall in oil supplies (oil imports accounted for
about 85 per cent of total energy requirements)
would imply a 10 per cent decline in National
Income, and falls of production of 20 per cent in
the chemical industries, 15 per cent in the auto-
mobile industries, and 11-15 per cent in steel.
While Japan's dependence on oil imports to cover
total energy requirements was the most pro-
nounced of the main industrialised countries,
other areas were also heavily dependent (Western
Europe to about 63 per cent, the United States to
about 17.5 per cent).
High dependence, however, meant in fact more
than this. It also implied that any shortfall of oil
imports from the oil producer action group (be
it OPEC which used the threat of supply inter-
ruptions as bargaining card, or Arab producers
who unsheathed the oil weapon) could not be
replaced. Replacement, in turn, could mean two
things: diversification or substitution.
A first factor barring replacement is simply the
enormous quantities involved in the international
trade in oil. Total OPEC oil exports in 1973
amounted to 1,311.777 mill.t. Maximum reduc-
tions in output of the Arab oil producers during
the 1973/74 crisis stood at about 4.2 mill.b/d
(approx. 210 mill.t/year). These considerable
quantities have to be contrasted with the fact that
there has been virtually no stand-by capacity to
increase oil production substantially outside OPEC
since US production peaked out in 1970; and even
within OPEC stand-by capacity is heavily con-
centrated in the Arab world. Stocks could also not
fill the gap, since the nature of oil makes stocking
of large amounts expensive. (However, expanded
stock programmes in the industrialised countries
have been put into effect in recent years, resulting
in a reduction of vulnerability.)
So diversification wasand isno solution for
the reduction of dependence of industrialised con-
sumer countries. Neither is substitution of oil by
other sources of energymainly again because
of the enormous amounts involved, but also
because of the difficulty of increasing production
in alternative sources of energy such as coal,
natural gas and nuclear energy.
Finally, recycling of oil again did not offer any
prospects of reducing dependence (contrary to
other raw materials such as copper or iron): oil
is mainly burned to provide energy, and only the
small share of consumption by the industries
which use oil as a raw material can in principle be
recycled.
The second factor accounting for oil power is the
uneven distribution of losses between producers
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and consumers in the case of supply reductions.
While we already have seen that the overriding
importance of energy makes consumers extremely
vulnerable, the producers as a group would suffer
much less from a reduction of production. In fact,
even now production rates of OPEC as a group
are higher than necessary to earn the revenues
required domestically, and it can be argued that
some producers still export much more oil than
is in their economic interest. This has led to the
accumulation of huge financial surplusesand
these surpluses contribute to making producers
better equipped to face confrontation in the inter-
national oil market. Theoretically, some producers
could virtually stop production and exports, and
pay their import bills out of their reserves for a
considerable length of time. However, this did not
even prove necessary in 1973/74 since the low
elasticity of demand in the short term made it
possible to increase prices by more than the
amount necessary to make up the shortfall in
revenues as a consequence of export reductions.
Even the danger of longer-term effects of in-
creased prices did not really constitute a weak-
ness of the producers (though that was far from
clear at the time). The price of oil in relation to
alternative sources of energy was until 1973 so
low that even the quadrupling of 1973/74 did not
make it uncompetitive. Moreover OPEC not only
controls a vast share of total world oil reserves,
but reserves with a very high competitive margin
in terms of investment outlays as well as produc-
tion costs. The potential to increase prices was,
therefore, very huge in 1973.
The only real ceiling to oil power appears to lie
in the political and economic interdependence of
producers and consumers: a severe crisis in the
industrialised countries is bound eventually to
affect the economies of the oil producers; it also
might have political repercussions which are
thought undesirable by producers. In that sense,
oil power now appears to have been pushed close
to its limitations.
The third ingredient of oil power is the fact that
at least in the short termconsumer dependence
on oil is not balanced by producer dependence on
trade with the industrialised countries. Various
possibilities of organising a counter-embargo
against the Arab oil producers were discussed in
1973/74and rejected as impracticable. However,
to the extent that oil producers manage to indus-
trialise they will become more closely integrated
into the world economyand this, no doubt, will
reduce their oil power. While oil power in the
short term gives considerable leverage on the basis
of an imbalanced trade relationship, there is an
inverse underlying imbalance - the imbalance
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between industrialised and developing countries. It
still has to be seen whether oil power is sufficient
to redress this imbalance before it is eroded.
Fourthly, oil power was made possible only
through a substantial change in the international
system itself. The Western world has gradually
lost control over producer countriesa control
which rested on the direct political influence and
military power of the West, and the power of the
oil companies, particularly the majors. The
erosion of control became obvious in 1973/74-
the American threat of military intervention was
at best the threat of totally irrational behaviour
should the supply crisis become unbearable; it did
not constitute a viable political option to preserve
Western interests. The change in the international
system can probably be interpreted as a weaken-
ing of feudal elements in its structure. The inter-
national system was 'feudal' in the sense that it
rested on interaction between the centre states
(the industrialised countries) and between
centre states and periphery states (the developing
countries) in bilateral relations, while interaction
between periphery states was almost nonexistent.
It was the co-operation between OPEC states, and
within the Arab producer action group, which
contributed to the successes of oil power. Even
this co-operation, however, has shown its limita-
tions in the inability to agree on a formal produc-
tion prorationing scheme, and in the marginal
competition between producers in recent months.
All of which would lead one to conclude that
the degree of co-operation (and willingness to
subordinate immediate interests for long-term
gain) which would be required of other raw
material producers in order to emulate the
success of OPEC would be very great indeed. The
special ingredients of OPEC power which have
been enumerated abovethe high degree of
importer dependence, the high cost of stock-piling
and limited possibilities of substitution or recyc-
ling, the producers' control over cheaply exploit-
able reserves, their substantial foreign exchange
reserves and low dependence on importsare
likely to be absent, or present in a much weaker
form, in the case of other commodities. Additional
strength might be gained if co-operative action
were to embrace the producers of several com-
modities, rather than of a single commodity. But
the basic power imbalance between the developed
and the developing countries probably makes the
co-operation of the former essential for any
attempt to renovate the international economic
order. In the long run commodity agreements will
probably prove a more profitable solution to the
developing countries than producer cartelsfor
oil as well as for other commodities.
